There are many kinds of control networks, which have been used in various non-IP network areas, such as BA (Building Automation), FA (Factory Automation) and PA (Process Automation). They are now introducing IP and face the issues of security and configuration complexity. The authors have proposed a model which intends to solve these issues while satisfying restrictions, i.e. small embedded devices, isolated networks and private naming system/name space, which are required when introducing new functionality into existing control networks. Secure bootstrap sequence and device-to-device communication using the chain of trust are the points of the model. This paper shows the practicability of the model through implementing the model experimentally.
cause the small embedded devices commonly used in control networks have limited computational performance because of their restricted requirements of cost, physical size and power consumption. The other issue is the configuration complexity of the control networks. Devices are usually manually configured in the fields whereas their user interfaces are not so powerful, like PCs. However, the number of devices are increasing because measuring and controlling need to be more precise. For example, a BA system of a large building complex in Japan has 170,000 control points with 16,500 devices * * * * * . This will present not only the cost of engineering but also the possibility of human errors in the future if a labor-saving mechanism is not introduced.
The following are restrictions when introducing new functionality into the control networks.
• Small embedded devices:
The small embedded devices commonly used in the control networks have limited computational performance because of their restricted requirements of cost, physical size and power consumption. Some devices will have more powerful CPUs in the future. At the same time, low-power CPUs will survive because choice of CPU depends upon not only cost performance but also power consumption which has an impact against battery operation or bus width which has an impact on circuit size.
• Isolated network environments:
The control networks do not always require connectivities to the Internet even though introducing IP. It is the user's choice whether to connect to the Internet. Hence, functions introduced into them have to work well under an isolated network environment.
• Private naming system and private name space:
Information of the control networks, not only the traffic but also device's name, has to be confidential, because the information can help to indicate corporate activities, e.g. the capability of plants.
Hence, the naming system should be closed to the public if operators desire. It is also important not to force a device's identity to be global unique if most of the devices should not be accessed from outside. For the above two reasons, DNS is not an appropriate naming system for them.
We have proposed a model [7] , which intends to solves the above issues while satisfying the above restrictions when introducing IP into the control networks. It is important for them to inherit existing property when introducing new functions because they have large property, e.g. specification, operational knowledge and applications. This is the reason the model is a framework whose functions are addressed to either below the application layer or the middle-ware instead of inventing new control network protocols.
In this paper, we show the practicability of the model by implementing it experimentally. This paper shows an overview of the model in Section 2, details of the model in Section 3, the implemented system in Section 4, considerations through implementation in Section 5, related work in Section 6 and further study items in Section 7.
Proposed Model

Network Security
The authors have already studied a security mechanism [6] which can satisfy the restrictions described in Section 1. We will use this mechanism in our proposed model. The following are the features of the security mechanism.
• This mechanism provides end-to-end security.
Most control networks rely on a firewall model which assumes specific network topology. However, end-to-end security will be necessary because wireless technology and nomadic devices break the firewall model. • Communication is protected by IPsec [8] which provides IP packets with confidentiality, integrity and authentication with the other end. IPsec is useful because its enforcement is independent from applications and sharable among them. IPsec is applicable to small embedded devices due to not using public key cryptography.
• It is important for IPsec to share a secret, which is called IPsec SA (Security Association), between both ends. Key exchange protocols will be important if running IPsec on small embedded devices because these devices do not have a powerful user interface like a PC, which makes manual keying difficult. The security mechanism uses not IKE (the Internet Key Exchange) [9] but KINK (Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys) [10] for the key exchange protocol. IKE is the most popular key exchange protocol for IPsec. However, it is not suited to small embedded devices because the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is mandatory. KINK can work well on small embedded devices because KINK is based upon Kerberos † [11] , where public key cryptography is not mandated.
• In the security mechanism, a node's identity is in the manner of Kerberos, i.e. a principal-id, which is a combination of a realm name and a principal name.
Auto-configuration using a Directory Service
To simplify the configuration process, the model provides the device's application layer with an autoconfiguration mechanism. The basic ideas of the autoconfiguration are 1) to minimize pre-installed information in a device, and 2) to acquire most information from servers located in networks. IP address configurations are beyond the scope of the model. It can be done by DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) in IPv4 or RFC2462 in IPv6, with which the model can be combined. The auto-configuration requires not only name/address resolution like DNS but also general data handling, e.g. searching, getting and updating data. We introduce our own directory service named PS (Property Server) [12] . The following are the features of PS.
• Hence, the minimum information with which a device has to be pre-installed is a principal-id and a key shared with KDC, i.e. a secret key of Kerberos. Other information can be acquired from PS.
Device-to-Device Communication
In control networks, communication is occupied by control messages and notification messages between devices, e.g. controllers, sensors and actuators. Hence, devices have to discover trusted peers, then to exchange messages with them under secure channels. The Chain of Trust can be applied in that case.
1. Devices search their peers using PS because they have already know trusted PS. (see Section 2.3). 2. Devices should trust peers which trusted PS provides. The communication is protected by IPsec. Figure 1 shows the bootstrap sequence and the deviceto-device communication using the chain of trust. Details of each function is shown in Figure 2 through Figure 6 .
Details of the Model
1. KDC Discovery (KDCD): DHCP server(s) advertise KDC related information, e.g. KDC's IP address(es) and realm name(s) where KDC offers authentication services and NTP related information, e.g. NTP server's IP address(es), (see Figure 2 ).
Authenticating KDC:
Device X needs to authenticate KDC advertised by DHCP server (see Figure 3 ). First, X adjusts its clock with NTP server because Kerberos requires that every device synchronize its clock to Dev-to-dev comm. 
PS Discovery (PSD):
Device X acquires PS's information from KDC (see Figure 4 ). X shows its principal-id to KDC. Then KDC returns PS's information, i.e. PS's principalid and IP address(es). X has to acquire a service ticket for PSD, e.g. TICKET(PSD), prior to the above procedures. KRB PRIV messages, which need a service ticket, are used for protecting PSD because IPsec/KINK cannot be used at this moment.
Booting up:
Device X registers its own information to PS which is used for device discovery, and acquires its boot data from PS. Then, the bootstrap sequence is completed (see Figure 5 ). First, X acquires a service ticket for KINK with 5. Device-to-device communication: Device X can discover device Y using PS, i.e. device discovery, then starts the device-to-device communication with Y (see Figure 6 ). First, X discovers Y through PS. A typical example is that X resolves Y's IP address from Y's identity like DNS. IPsec between X and PS has already been established at the bootstrap sequence. Second, X acquires a service ticket for KINK with Y, e.g. TICKET(KINK w/ Y), from KDC. Third, IPsec is established between X and Y after exchanging KINK messages. Then the devices can exchange application messages which are protected by IPsec.
Implemented System
We implemented the model to examine its practicabil- Table 1 shows the specifications of an experimentally implemented device, whose CPU is H8/3029 (Renesas Technology Corp.), which has cryptographic hardware in a Xilinx's FPGA. Renesas's H8 family is a popular low-end CPU in Japan. Table 2 shows the specifications of servers which were used for the system. Table 3 shows the code size of the device. The total size will be about 30K bytes greater if the cryptography, i.e. 3DES and MD5, is implemented by software instead of hardware. The bootstrap sequence described in Section 2. 
Performance of the Device-to-Device Communication
As described in Section 2.4, the device-to-device communication has the overhead (see F through G of Figure  1 or Figure 6 for details). If the device is an initiator of the communication, the overhead is PS GET,IP sec , TGS and KINK I . If the device is a responder of the communication, it is only KINK R . Once IPsec is established between devices, the performance of IPsec is one of the major factors. The overhead of the sequence and IPsec are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 . The values without parentheses mean net processing times and the values in parentheses mean waiting times. The throughput of IPsec ESP inbound is omitted because both performances are nearly the same.
Considerations
Object Code Size
Object code size is improved from the previous prototype [13] , i.e. from 419K bytes to 272K bytes. Kerberos related implementations(Kerberos and KINK) contributes the improvement. The previous implementation was ported from MIT implementation whereas the current one is our original code which simplify program of encoding/decoding messages, especially ASN.1. To reduce the current code, it is necessary to shrink the IP part which occupies about 50% of the entire code. Hardwired functions, such as off-load engine, may contribute the code size. It can be a further study item to shrink the object code size.
Performance of the Bootstrap Sequence
The sequence takes 793 msec or 1754 msec with or without cryptographic hardware (see Table 5 ). It will usually take one or several days to start the entire system if the system is a large one due to starting subsystem by subsystem for making sure. If assuming to start a system described in Section 1 with device-by-device manner, i.e. seventeen thousand devices, within 24 hours, every device will have to start within 5 seconds on average. The actual margin is longer than the above time because of starting a system in a subsystem-by subsystem manner instead of device-by-device usually. Hence, the performances of the sequence can be acceptable.
We may have to consider for burst accesses to servers if the system has a large number of devices. For the device side, randomly delayed bootstrap can be a solution. However, the necessity and the validity are future study items. For the server side, redundancy can be a solution, i.e. the redundancies of KDCs and PSs. It is not difficult to make KDC redundant [14] . But it is a further study item for PS.
Performance of Device-to-Device Communication
The overhead of the initiator takes 290 msec or 766 msec with or without cryptographic hardware (see Table 5 ). The overhead happens when both the device starts and the lifetime of Kerberos's tickets or IPsec SAs is expired. The former case can be acceptable with the reasons in Section 5.2. The latter case should be considered because the response time of control network systems should usually be on the hundred microsecond order. However, the overhead can be acceptable if the lifetimes are long enough, e.g. days, weeks or months, and are tuned operationally. The overhead of the responder can also be acceptable because it is shorter than the initiator's. Another possible way is to introduce priority into the IP packet processing of a device. For example, the overhead described above will have less impact if the IP stack of the device has fast-path and slow-path, and application packets are assigned to fast-path and other packets including Kerberos and KINK are assigned to slow-path. This can be a further study item.
As an example of IPsec's throughput, the processing time for 1024-byte payload takes 5 msec or 307 msec with or without cryptographic hardware (see Table 6 ). Considering the response time, i.e. the hundred microsecond order, the former case is fast enough, but the latter is not. The performance can be improved with AES instead of 3DES if the device cannot introduce cryptographic hardware.
NTP Server
Kerberos assumes that the clock of each device is adjusted to the clock of the KDC. It is used for preventing from some replay attacks. This is why our proposed model uses NTP server. However, for example, a malicious NTP server can advertise bogus time to devices. If a difference between the clocks of the KDC and the device is more than the allowable clock skew, the KDC will reject any request from the device, then the bootstrap sequence will be failed.
[15] showed an extension that was able to relax the requirement of the time synchronization. The extension has already included into the specifications of both Kerberos and KINK. If the difference is greater than the skew limit, the KDC returns an error message that includes the difference. Consequently, the device stores the difference, and uses it to adjust the time to process further messages. Hence, the device can finish its bootstrap sequence. If a system requires a trusted NTP server the device-to-device communication can be used additionally. First, the NTP server implements the proposed model described in Section 2. Second, the NTP server starts its service before any device starts. Third, a device can find the NTP server from PS, then can synchronize its clock again under security of Kerberos, KINK and IPsec after the device completes its bootstrap sequence.
Related Work
There are models of device's auto-configuration. This section shows differences between our model and others.
Jini † has the following features: 1) Engaged distributed object technology, e.g. RMI, CORBA, SOAP, can distribute service entities over networks. 2) Servers named Lookup Service manage objects named Proxy. A client has to load an appropriate Proxy when using a distributed service remotely. 3) Lookup Service, which is necessary for registering a Proxy by a service entity and for loading a Proxy by a client, can be discovered on demand with IP multicast. Jini may be suited to the purpose at which our model aims since both models can provide any required data to devices. The early version of Jini had security issues, e.g. [16] , then Jini v2 [17] enhanced it. However, it is difficult to compare the actual security mechanism of Jini with that of our model because it is hidden away from the specification by Java Class. Hence, Jini's applicability to devices cannot be identified. Jini v2 introduced Trust Verifier by which a client can verity the integrity of a loaded Proxy. The idea of Trust Verifier can be useful for our model because our model can also provide program code to devices remotely. SLP (Service Location Protocol) [18] provides locations of services as URLs. SLP servers, i.e. Service Agent and Directory Agent, can be discovered on demand with IP multicast. Cache servers named Directory Agent contribute scalability to SLP. Please note that SLP does not have any service entity itself. Our model has a service entity named PS which can provide any required data, e.g. application program and data, under a secure environment. Hence, to examine if SLP can be used in our model is appropriate rather than to compare both models equally. SLP may be applicable to KDCD instead of DHCP.
UPnP
† † (Universal Plug and Play) [19] uses SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), HTTP and TCP for control messages and GENA (General Event Notification Architecture), HTTP and TCP for notification messages whereas existing control networks usually use UDP for those purposes. This means that they will have to be changed if introducing UPnP. Hence, the goal of UPnP is different from our model because one of our goals is to minimize the impact on them when introducing an auto-configuration mechanism. Public key cryptography is mandated for UPnP. So UPnP's applicability to devices is also different from our model.
Further Study Items
Sharing Mechanism of a Kerberos's Secret Key
Kerberos assumes that each device shares their Kerberos's secret keys with KDC. However it is important for control networks how to share a secret key between a device and KDC because there can be a huge number of devices whose user interfaces are limited in a system. There are two approaches to share a secret key. One is to ship a device with a secret key. The user reads the secret key, then sets it to KDC. The other is on-site installation. The user creates and installs a secret key into the device. However, we have to consider those approaches further because of their insufficiency as described below.
For the former approach, it assumes that KDC has a pair of a public key and a private key, and KDC is specified before a device is shipped. Then it will be possible to ship the device with a Kerberos's secret key and a KDC's public key. Consequently, the device can provide the secret key which is protected with the KDC's public key. For example, this technique may be suited to small embedded devices mentioned in Section 1 if using low exponent RSA because the operations of encryption and verification are cheap while the operations of decryption and signature are expensive. However, this technique has the following restrictions. 1) A device requires a communication channel to read the secret key encrypted with the KDC's public key.
2) The channel is out-of-band from the proposed model described in Section 2. 3) Readout is done with deviceby-device manner. 4) A device has the KDC's public key when shipping. Please note that the secret key can be updated with Kerberos's administration command ,e.g. kpasswd, remotely after finishing sharing the secret key.
For the latter approach, [20] proposed resurrecting duckling security policy model where a weak device can establish a master-slave relationship with other device securely under ad-hoc environment. In ad-hoc environ- † † UPnP is a trademark of the UPnP Implementers Corporation. ment, a device have to assume the absence of an online server. Figure 7 shows a summary of resurrecting duckling security policy model. A device called a duckling has two states, i.e. imprint-able and imprinted, and the initial state is imprint-able. When other device called a mother duck sets a shared key called an ignition key, the duckling changes the state to imprinted, then obeys the mother duck. When the duckling deletes the ignition key by the mother duck 's order, the duckling changes the state to imprint-able, then is ready to accept a new mother duck. If a writer which installs a Kerberos's secret key into a device is a mother duck and if a device where the secret key is installed is a duckling, the Kerberos's secret key will be installed into the device under ad-hoc environment such as an installation field. It may be better to separate the Kerberos's secret key from the ignition key. However, this technique has the following restrictions. 1) A device has a communication channel with a writer. The channel have to provide confidentiality and integrity by itself, e.g. electrical contact rather than wireless, because an ignition key from a mother duck to a duckling is plain text (see [20] for details).
2) The channel is out-of-band from the proposed model described in Section 2. 3) Installation is done with device-by-device manner. 
Kerberos's Inter-realm Operation
It is common for management to divide a large system into small manageable domains, which are called realms in the manner of Kerberos. In the case of Kerberos, inter-realm is the technique to federate operational realms by sharing a secret between KDCs (see Figure 8 ). However, inter-realm has issues when being applied to control networks as follows.
• inter-realm costs a device when the device speaks to another device which belongs to a different realm (see Figure 9 ). 1) The device has to traverse realms until it reaches the destined realm.
2) The device has to find a path to traverse realms. It is the device's responsibility to find the next hop 3) The device has to acquire special tickets, which are called cross-realm TGT, to traverse realms. The number of tickets to be acquired are in proportion to the number of realms to be traversed. These can be expensive for small embedded devices.
• Host centric fashion mentioned above can be a cause of inconsistency if a system has a huge number of and a variety of devices. For example, it is the device's responsibility to find the next hop of KDC. However, compatibility of device's behavior about finding path is not obvious because the specification of Kerberos does not define about traversing realms precisely. Consequently, the device's behavior depends upon its implementation.
• Inter-realm is formed by chaining KDCs. The device will be unable to traverse KDCs even if one of the intermediate KDCs is unavailable.
PKINIT [21] , PKCROSS [22] † and KDC referrals [23] which are under discussion in IETF may be able to solve some of the above issues.
Conclusion
Through implementing the model experimentally, this paper shows the practicability of our proposed model † [22] has already expired. However, PKCROSS can revive after PKINIT is completed because PKCROSS depends upon PKINIT.
which is intended to solve the issues, i.e. security and configuration complexity, while satisfying the restrictions, i.e. small embedded devices, isolated networks, private name space/naming system and inheriting the property. Secure bootstrap sequence and device-todevice communication using the chain of trust are the points of the model.
There are several further study items. The first is to shrink the IP protocol stack. The object code size of the prototype device achieves 270K bytes. It will be necessary to shrink the IP protocol stack if smaller code is required. The second is priority processing in the IP protocol stack. The device's performance of the bootstrap sequence and device-to-device communication can be acceptable if the lifetimes of Kerberos's ticket and IPsec SAs are turned operationally, and if cryptography is implemented reasonably, i.e. cryptographic hardware or faster algorithm than 3DES in software. However the overheads can not be zero. Hence, priority processing in the IP protocol stack, such as fast-path and slowpath, may reduce influence of the overheads. The third is redundancy of the servers, i.e. KDC and PS. The fourth is the mechanism of sharing a Kerberos's secret key between a devince and KDC. The fifth is to optimize inter-realm operation for small embedded devices.
